Barking at the big dogs: South Africa's foreign policy towards the Middle East by JORDAAN, Eduard
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
8-2008
Barking at the big dogs: South Africa's foreign
policy towards the Middle East
Eduard JORDAAN
Singapore Management University, ejordaan@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530802207344
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
JORDAAN, Eduard.(2008). Barking at the big dogs: South Africa's foreign policy towards the Middle East. Round Table, 97(397),
547-559.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/563
Barking at the Big Dogs: South Africa’s
Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East
EDUARD JORDAAN
School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University, Singapore
ABSTRACT This article places South Africa’s foreign policy towards the Middle East in the
context of the country’s general foreign policy. South Africa is classiﬁed as a middle power, given
its penchant for international ‘bridge-building’ and multilateralism. With regard to the Middle
East, South Africa has frequently oﬀered itself as a mediator in the region’s various conﬂicts and
continues to do so. However, the argument proposed here is that there is an ‘anti-imperialist’
strain in South Africa’s foreign policy that renders it unlikely to be regarded as an impartial
broker in the various Middle East conﬂicts. South Africa’s middle power proclivities, as well as its
anti-imperialist tendencies, are demonstrated with regard to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict, recent events involving Lebanon, and Hamas’s
2006 electoral victory.
KEY WORDS: South African foreign policy, Middle East, Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict,
Lebanon, Iran, Iraq
Introduction
This article considers South Africa’s foreign policy towards the Middle East. While a
few scholars have written on the topic (Benjamin, 2001; Hughes, 2004), the
contribution this article aims to make lies in taking account of recent events in the
Middle East and in situating South Africa’s foreign policy towards the region in
the context of the country’s general foreign policy. Identifying the gist of South
Africa’s foreign policy is no straightforward task, as commentators have struggled to
make sense of the country’s foreign policy, seeing it as fraught with inconsistency,
randomness, even incoherence. Nevertheless, there has been some convergence of
opinion on the classiﬁcation of South Africa as a ‘middle power’, a notion which,
despite its conceptual fuzziness, helps us to identify a certain consistency to South
Africa’s foreign policy behaviour (e.g. Bischoﬀ, 2003; Hamill and Lee, 2001; Nel,
Taylor and Van der Westhuizen, 2001; Van der Westhuizen, 1998).
Middle powers are supreme bridge-builders and multilateralists that character-
istically perform two important tasks in the international system: they try to increase
order in the international system, which includes legitimizing the norms espoused by
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the hegemon; and they perform morally commendable tasks for the good of
international society. Given that the middle power category includes countries as
diverse as Mexico, Turkey, Sweden and the Netherlands, some scholars have felt it
necessary to draw a distinction between traditional and emerging middle powers
(Cooper, 1997, p. 18; Jordaan, 2003). Examples of traditional middle powers include
Australia, Canada, Norway and Sweden, whereas Argentina, Malaysia, Nigeria and
South Africa have all been mooted as examples of emerging middle powers at some
point (Cooper, 1997). Traditional middle powers are wealthy, egalitarian, politically
stable social democracies that are not regionally inﬂuential, while emerging middle
powers are semi-peripheral, economically unequal, recently democratized states that
display considerable regional inﬂuence. Behaviourally, traditional middle powers
display a faint and ambivalent regional orientation and oﬀer appeasing concessions
to pressures for global economic reform, whereas emerging middle powers
demonstrate a ﬁrm regional orientation and association, favour regional integration,
and adopt, at most, a reformist attitude to the global economic order (Jordaan,
2003). As regionally powerful but internationally weak semi-peripheral states,
emerging middle powers are perennially caught between the expectations of powerful
states and their loyalty to developing countries in their region and beyond, whose
loyalty emerging middle powers in turn depend upon in order to credibly and
legitimately speak on their behalf. While the self-association and global position of
emerging middle powers occasionally lead them into confrontation with the major
powers, emerging middle powers cannot aﬀord for these conﬂicts to be so vehement
that they undermine their ability to build bridges and maintain order in international
society.
Despite its role and interest in maintaining the current order, South Africa seems
determined not to be seen as a lackey of the West. South Africa is, after all, a
developing country that strongly identiﬁes with Africa and the ‘South’. Indeed,
South Africa frequently presents itself as a spokesperson for Africa and the rest of
the developing world. To maintain the allegiance of its partners in the developing
world, South Africa has often felt it necessary to resist Western dominance on
various fronts, a tendency Laurie Nathan (2005, p. 363) has identiﬁed as the ‘‘anti-
imperialist’’ streak in South Africa’s foreign policy. While Nathan’s identiﬁcation of
an anti-imperialist element in South African foreign policy is useful, the term should
be circumscribed in at least the following ways. First, South Africa’s anti-
imperialism is very mild and does not venture beyond actions that are ultimately
symbolic and which, at most, lend weight to the principles, interpretations and
justiﬁcations of those who stand opposed to the United States and its allies. Second,
South African ‘anti-imperialism’ is conﬁned to resistance to certain powers and
interests that show themselves during transnational conﬂicts of an ostensibly political
nature. Concomitantly, South African anti-imperialism should be stripped of any
economic connotations for, even though the country’s policy-makers sometimes
‘‘talk left’’, they certainly ‘‘walk right’’, in the words of Patrick Bond. This is shown
by the African National Congress (ANC) government’s neo-liberal economic
policies, as well as by South Africa’s role at the World Trade Organization, where
US and EU delegations used an obliging South Africa to persuade other developing
countries to accept their proposals (Lee, 2006, p. 57). The extent of South Africa’s
oﬃcial discomfort with the current global economic order has hardly been
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fundamental; rather, it has been limited to calling for a more consistent application
of liberal economic principles and for measures to support those at the wrong end of
the global economic scale. Third, South African anti-imperialism is also only aimed
against the West—South Africa has of late been silent about China’s occupation of
Tibet and its aggressive economic pursuits in Africa. Fourth, South African foreign
policy is marked by an outspoken insistence on respect for the sovereignty of
developing states (including the occupied Palestinian territories) to a point where
South Africa’s position clashes with the demands, interests and actions of the West
in the developing world. South Africa’s respect for national sovereignty also
obstructs its ability (and its willingness) to insist on human rights and democracy,
responsibility for which rests most heavily with national-level political authorities.
Middle powers are characteristically eager peacemakers and the Middle East is a
region rife with conﬂicts for a middle power such as South Africa to mediate, as it
has attempted to do in the past. While South Africa’s past interventions led to no
visible success, it has remained interested in mediating some of the conﬂicts in the
Middle East. Although some distance from the major powers and from major
conﬂicts is necessary to be regarded as an ‘‘honest broker’’ (Cox, 1996, p. 244), the
anti-imperialist tendencies in South African foreign policy that have surfaced with
regard to various conﬂicts in the Middle East have seriously damaged South Africa’s
suitability as a potential mediator in the region. Below, South Africa’s position on
Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict,
recent events involving Lebanon, and Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory, will be
considered. It will be shown that while South Africa’s response is foremost that of a
middle power, it usually drifts into an anti-imperialist posture. But ﬁrst, it is
necessary to place South Africa’s position on problems relating to the Middle East in
the context of the country’s evolving post-apartheid foreign policy.
South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy
Hamill and Lee (2001, p. 34), postulate that middle power status is conferred in two
ways. According to the ﬁrst method, middle powers fall between superpowers and
small powers when states are ranked in terms of an aggregate of their military,
economic and strategic capabilities. The second and more useful approach considers
mid-range capability to be a necessary condition for middle power status and
requires, in addition, that states exhibit certain types of foreign policy behaviour,
speciﬁcally an activist internationalism that tries hard to ﬁnd peaceful and
cooperative solutions to international problems, usually by steering these problems
towards multilateral forums for resolution (see also Cox, 1996, p. 244). As
mentioned, middle-power foreign policy is driven by an inordinate desire, ﬁrstly, for
orderliness, security and predictability in international relations; and secondly, to
perform certain morally inspired ‘‘good works’’ in the international system (Cooper,
1997, p. 7). The manner in which middle powers perform these tasks has been
categorized as falling along a heroic-routine continuum (Cooper, 1997, p. 10), where
a ‘heroic’ style refers to a high degree of publicity and risk-taking and a ‘routine’
style to discreet and consensus-building practices.
The behaviour-centred approach to middle-power identiﬁcation emphasizes that
foreign policy behaviour is not structurally predetermined, since states that occupy
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similar positions in the global pecking order do not necessarily exhibit the same
foreign policy behaviour. To better appreciate the variation among the foreign
policies of states with mid-range capabilities one should pay particular attention to
‘‘the way in which decision-makers perceive or evaluate their options, their interests,
and the likely outcomes of speciﬁc actions – in short, their ideas’’ (Nel, 2006, p. 109,
emphasis in original). South Africa’s democratization entailed the assumption of
power by an elite whose world view was vastly diﬀerent to that of the white minority
government they replaced. South Africa’s transition to democracy was accompanied
by an intense reformulation of the country’s national identity through a highly
moralistic language in which words such freedom, equality and human rights ﬁgured
prominently. The oﬃcial redirection of South Africa’s identity also found expression
in the ‘new’ South Africa’s foreign policy; whereas apartheid South Africa was an
international outcast and a regional aggressor, post-apartheid foreign policy was
characterized by high moral purpose and active good international citizenship.
In 1993, Nelson Mandela, who became South African president in 1994, published
an article in Foreign Aﬀairs that expressed the principles that were to guide the ANC
government’s foreign policy during Mandela’s tenure. Mandela declared human
rights, the worldwide promotion of democracy, respect for international law, non-
violent solutions to conﬂict, special regard for Africa, and economic development
through cross-border economic cooperation to be the six pillars of South Africa’s
future foreign policy (Mandela, 1993, p. 87). Buoyed by its celebrated election to
power, the ANC government embarked on highly visible and idealistic foreign policy
pursuits. As a middle-income country and a regional hegemon, South Africa was
also relatively well equipped to achieve its foreign policy ambitions, a prerequisite for
middle powers (Hamill and Lee, 2001, p. 35). Since South Africa’s transition to
democracy, it has mediated conﬂicts in places like the former Zaire and Ivory Coast,
and sent peacekeepers to Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi.
South Africa also assumed leadership positions in a range of multilateral forums,
including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth, the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) and various UN agencies, and sought to
reinvigorate these to better serve the developing world. The ANC government’s
foreign policy inﬂuence relied heavily on South Africa’s perceived moral authority,
which derived from South Africa’s peaceful transition to a democratic system, from
being the only country to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons, from its victory
over racism and oppression, from its powerful regional position and, of course, from
the charisma and moral stature of Nelson Mandela.
During his presidency, Mandela dominated South African foreign policy in a style
that was certainly ‘heroic’, but also rather out of step with what other states were
willing or able to do. It was not long before the limits of pursuing an idealistic
foreign policy in isolation from other states dawned on foreign policy decision-
makers. One event proved particularly formative: in 1995, Nigerian dictator Sani
Abacha had Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other activists executed after Mandela had
personally pleaded for clemency. Mandela reacted by calling for an oil embargo
against Nigeria and for the country to be expelled from the Commonwealth. His call
fell on deaf ears. Stung by its failure, South Africa gradually began to move from the
heroic and unilateral inclinations of the Mandela-era towards a more cautious and
multilateral foreign policy that placed stronger emphasis on the ‘national interest’.
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Subsequently, economic and security interests were aﬀorded greater signiﬁcance,
while issues of human rights and democracy were so reduced in priority that South
Africa nowadays rarely condemns human-rights abuses in the developing world.
As recent scholarship documents, multilateralism has become a central component
of South African foreign policy (Lee, Taylor and Williams, 2006). South Africa uses
multilateral channels for a number of reasons, some of which accord with its middle
power role, while some are more in line with its anti-imperialist tendencies. First,
South Africa has found regional and continental institutions handy as a screen for
dealing with other African countries and so to avoid appearing as a unilateralist
bully. Second, although South Africa has rather uncritically bought into the
neoliberal agenda (Lee, 2006, p. 56; Taylor and Williams, 2006), it has used
multilateral platforms to campaign on behalf of the world’s poorest (Cornelissen,
2006). Third, and typical of a middle power, South Africa has been insistent that
conﬂict in the international system be resolved through negotiation in multilateral
settings. In the case of conﬂict in Africa, South Africa has put its faith in the African
Union (AU) while, with regard to conﬂicts in the Middle East, it has repeatedly
stated its preference for conﬂict resolution to take place under the banner of UN
agencies. Regarding the fourth way in which multilateralism serves South African
foreign policy, we are reminded by Robert Cox that although multilateral
institutions are disseminators of hegemonic norms, they can also advance counter-
hegemonic ideas and interests. In this regard, South Africa has viewed some
international institutions as a site for political struggle, a space in which to challenge
the major powers. Most notably, South Africa has sought an expansion of the
UNSC, which would see Africa gain two permanent seats and ﬁve non-permanent
seats and a change in the way veto rights are exercised (Cornelissen, 2006, p. 37).
South Africa has also tried to move decision-making authority away from UNSC—
the country recently voted against a resolution condemning human-rights abuses in
Burma because it felt that the newly created Human Rights Council was the more
appropriate forum for such matters. Fifth, South Africa has used multilateral forums
as a place to present itself as a leader of Africa and the developing world by, for
example, hosting various world conferences and manoeuvring for a permanent seat
on a possibly expanded Security Council.
In sum, one might say that although South African foreign policy continues to
exhibit the traits of ‘middlepowership’, the country is increasingly being pulled away
from this role by a more upfront pursuit of its economic and security interests, as
well as by its desire to show solidarity with the non-Western world and its ambitions
to come across as leader of the developing world. The high stakes of the various
Middle East conﬂicts oﬀer South Africa a stage on which to register its protest
against the US and its allies and thereby demonstrate its independence and justify its
pursuit of leadership of the developing world.
South Africa and Recent Issues in Middle East Politics
Iran’s Nuclear Programme
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group presented the world with evidence that
Iran’s nuclear programme was far more advanced than generally suspected. Driven
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by the US, the international community piled on the pressure to prevent Iran from
developing nuclear weapons. Iran, despite sitting atop vast oil and natural gas
reserves, remained insistent that its nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes
but nevertheless resisted international eﬀorts to inspect its nuclear facilities. The
result has been a tense standoﬀ in an already volatile region.
South Africa’s involvement in the crisis stemmed from its occupation of a number
of important positions in multilateral institutions concerned with ﬁnding a solution
to the conﬂict: non-permanent member of the UNSC (2007–08), member of the
International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) board of governors, and leader of the
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to which Iran also belongs. South Africa is also a
peacemaker and an aspiring leader of the developing world. Signiﬁcantly, South
Africa enjoys a close relationship with Iran and has expressed no misgivings about
Iran’s status as, for example, a state-sponsor of terrorism or the world’s leading
executioner of children (Human Rights Watch, 2007). It is also important to bear in
mind that Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been South Africa’s two largest suppliers
of oil, a vulnerability that South Africa has started to address by increasingly
importing from Nigeria, Angola and Russia (Department of Trade and Industry,
2007). Nevertheless, for critics of the ANC government, South Africa’s friendship
with Iran ﬁts the party’s predilection for embracing all manner of international
outcasts, a menagerie that already includes Suharto, Fidel Castro and Muammar al-
Gadaﬃ.
On the face of it, South Africa played a commendable role in the Iran conﬂict—it
sought to mediate between conﬂicting parties and tried to shield a developing
country from being bullied by the US and its allies, in line with its duty as chair of
the NAM at the time. South Africa met with Iranian delegations on a number of
occasions to urge them to cooperate fully with UN nuclear inspectors. At the same
time, and still in line with the position of the NAM, South Africa defended the
‘‘inalienable right’’ of developing countries to use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes (Bloomberg, 2006; Non-Aligned Movement, 2005). South Africa further
tried to keep a lid on tensions by letting the IAEA deal with the Iran problem rather
than the UNSC. In September 2005, South Africa abstained on a vote by the IAEA
on whether or not to report Iran to the UNSC. In 2007, South Africa took up a seat
on the UNSC as one of the 10 non-permanent members and also used this forum to
argue against a heightening of the conﬂict between Iran and the international
community. On 19 March 2007, South Africa proposed extensive amendments to a
draft resolution that called for ‘‘modest’’ sanctions against Iran and was drawn up
by the ﬁve permanent members of the UNSC and Germany. In line with its soft
approach, South Africa proposed a 90-day time-out on sanctions against Iran. South
Africa also wanted proposals in the draft resolution calling for an embargo on
Iranian arms exports and targeted ﬁnancial sanctions to be dropped (CBS News,
2007). Even though South Africa continued to express ‘‘deep disappointment’’ that
not all its amendments were accommodated, Security Council Resolution 8980 was
unanimously adopted ﬁve days later in a form close to that which South Africa had
previously rejected.
Although it was acting in defence of a fellow-member of the NAM, South Africa’s
potential as a probable peace-broker has been damaged by using its institutional role
in the conﬂict over Iran’s nuclear programme to promote the anti-imperialist cause.
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In this regard, South Africa’s desire to be in solidarity with the developing world led
the country to adopt some rather questionable positions. For example, South Africa
has maintained that Iran is not in the process of developing nuclear weapons when it
most likely is and further encouraged ‘‘all initiatives aimed at restoring conﬁdence in
Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme’’ to which Iran has an ‘‘inalienable’’ right
(Bloomberg, 2006; Department of Foreign Aﬀairs, 2007a; Reuters, 2007).
Furthermore, South Africa’s ambassador to the UN, Dumisani Kumalo, further
opined that: ‘‘After all, there is no basis for arguing that mass-destruction weapons
are safe in some hands and not in others’’ (United Nations, 2007a). Kumalo coupled
this view with another defence of the Iranian government, by drawing a rather
strange distinction:
If the co-sponsors of the resolution were convinced that the Iranian programme
was a threat to international peace, then the Council should have been asked to
take a decision on a draft that had concentrated on that, and not act as if the
Iranian Government itself posed a threat to international peace and security
(United Nations, 2007a).
In addition to lending credibility to the claims of those aligned against the West,
South Africa’s anti-imperialism also manifested itself in the country’s attempts to use
the UN to contest the global arrangement of power beyond the Iran issue. After
rejecting the abovementioned Security Council draft resolution, Ambassador
Kumalo acknowledged that South Africa’s actions were in part to protest against
the exclusion of the ten non-permanent members from the drafting of the resolution
(Voice of America News, 2007) and insisted that South Africa was not on the
Security Council as ‘‘window dressing’’ (Khaleej Times, 2007).
While a certain degree of foreign policy combativeness is not incompatible with
the middle power role, middle powers should ultimately play a unifying role, which
South Africa failed to do on the Iran question. Instead, a Western diplomat on the
Security Council complained that South Africa had gone ‘‘too far’’ and that they had
‘‘broken the unity of the Security Council’’ (Financial Times, 2007). The anti-
imperialist tendency among South Africa’s foreign policy elite has also hampered its
ability to distinguish justiﬁed resistance to the US and its allies (e.g. in defence of the
Palestinians) from less legitimate causes (e.g. shielding the Iranian regime).
Ultimately, it is a poisoned gift for a country whose foreign policy inﬂuence
depends greatly on the moral high ground to be thanked by the Iranian foreign
minister ‘‘for its continuous support for Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes’’ (Bloomberg, 2006).
The Invasion of Iraq
In the lead-up to the American-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, South African
diplomats worked feverishly to prevent war. In an attempt to avert war, South
Africa had urged the Iraqis to cooperate fully with UN inspectors. In line with the
middle power role and its stated foreign policy principles, South Africa insisted on a
multilateral solution to problems surrounding Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons
of mass destruction, a commitment that was enhanced by South Africa’s then
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chairpersonship of the NAM and the AU (Hughes, 2004, p. 177). If war proved
necessary, the decision was to made by the UN.
South Africa’s oﬃcial reactions to the outbreak of war in Iraq convey a sense of
deep dismay. Deputy Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Aziz Pahad, for example, opened
his statement on the outbreak of war by saying: ‘‘The moment we feared and hoped
to avoid has arrived. A few hours ago war against Iraq started . . . This is a tragic
failure of negotiations and diplomacy’’ (Department of Foreign Aﬀairs, 2003). Yet,
dismay was not the only reaction. Outraged by American unilateralism, Mandela
fumed: ‘‘What I am condemning is that one power, with a president who has no
foresight, who cannot think properly, is now wanting to plunge the world into a
holocaust’’ (CBS News, 2003).
In spite of its vehement criticism of the US, South Africa soon retreated to a more
conciliatory role as South African government oﬃcials started giving assurances that
there was no rift between South Africa and the USA over the war in Iraq (Mail and
Guardian, 2003). In July 2003, US President George W. Bush visited South Africa
with the intention of improving relations, which the visit probably did, although not
all was forgiven. Bush’s presence was marked by protests and there was to be no
photo opportunity with Mandela, as has become customary for foreign luminaries
when visiting South Africa. As part of its rapprochement with the US, South Africa
generally refrained from commenting on the ongoing Allied occupation of Iraq
(while continuing to give a running commentary on the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict).
Although South Africa’s retreat was informed in part by a desire not to damage its
economic ties with the US (Bond, 2003), after the conventional war it became
apparent that South Africa and the US both wanted the same thing in Iraq—Iraqi
self-government as soon as possible. Moreover, South Africa’s inability to prevent
war in Iraq also demonstrated the country’s powerlessness in the face of a
superpower with a leadership determined to go to war, and thus merely reinforced
South Africa’s middle power impulses. While the US-led invasion of Iraq dealt ‘‘a
blow to multilateralism’’ (BBC News, 2003) and to the UN in particular, multilateral
channels remained the only avenue through which South Africa could hope to aﬀect
superpower policy, which is why South Africa repeatedly called for a strengthening
of the UN in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq.
Israeli–Palestinian Conﬂict
During the apartheid years, for a while at least, there was close military cooperation
between Israel and South Africa’s white government, while the ANC received
support from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Arab states. Despite
these historical associations, once in government, the ANC tried to let its dealing
with all the states in the Middle East be guided by a principle of ‘even-handedness’.
In practice this translated into formal recognition of the ‘State of Palestine’ and the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Palestinian Authority (Benjamin,
2001, p. 165). With regards to South Africa’s policy towards the ongoing conﬂict
between Israel and the Palestinians, South Africa has repeatedly stated its preference
for a two-state solution, with a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and with
East Jerusalem as its capital.
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In line with SouthAfrica’s self-image as a bridge-buildingmiddle power it has sought
to support and contribute to theMiddleEast Peace Process. Since SouthAfrica has very
limited inﬂuence over states in the Middle East, it has tried no more than to facilitate
dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Benjamin, 2001, p. 166; Hughes,
2004, p. 156). In 2002, South Africa hosted two rounds of trilateral talks at Spier Wine
Estate between Israelis, representatives of the Palestinian National Authority and
South African government oﬃcials and persons involved in the country’s negotiated
transition. These talks, however, yielded no discernable outcome and were regarded as
‘‘inconsequential’’ by some Israeli oﬃcials (Hughes, 2004, p. 156). The Spier talks
remain thehighpoint of SouthAfrica’s contribution to thepeace process.Continuing its
facilitator role, South Africa recently hosted the United Nations African Meeting on
theQuestion of Palestine, which amounted to littlemore than an opportunity to express
solidarity with the Palestinian aspiration to self-determination.
Although South Africa’s inﬂuence on the Middle East peace process has been
negligible, it remains eager to play a role. However, South Africa’s future contribution
is unlikely to amount to much, for a number of reasons. South Africa’s limited foreign
policy clout has been mentioned, while others also feel that South Africa’s lack of a
stake in the conﬂict should be a disqualiﬁcation (see Hughes, 2004, p. 156).
Furthermore, many South African contributors have a tedious habit of viewing a
solution to the Israel–Palestine issue in terms comparable to those of South Africa’s
peaceful transition to democracy, and of likening the Israeli strangulation of the
Palestinians to apartheid, all of which is too simplistic to be of much help. An asset
that could come in handy is South Africa’s close relationship with the Palestinians,
who are unlikely to have much faith in Western democracies. However, proximity to
the Palestinians has been accompanied by deteriorating relations with Israel, which
can be put down, in part, to the former’s condemnation of Israel’s treatment of
Palestinians in recent years, while South Africa’s recent absence during a United
Nations General Assembly vote on Holocaust denial also did nothing to improve
relations. Relations with Israel have also suﬀered as a result of South Africa’s desire to
stand in solidarity with Israel’s enemies, speciﬁcally its closeness to Iran and its defence
of Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory over Fatah, as well as its open criticism of the
Quartet (consisting of the EU, Russia, the UN and the USA), particularly the US, on
the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict. Such seeming partiality makes it unlikely that Israel
would put much trust in South Africa as a potential ‘honest broker’.
Recent Events Involving Lebanon
Lebanon has not enjoyed particular attention in South African foreign policy circles.
This changed as a result of two recent issues in international politics. The ﬁrst
concerns the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, which was mostly waged on
Lebanese territory, while the second pertains to the establishment of a UN tribunal
to try suspects in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Raﬁk Hariri in
February 2005. In South African policy on both these issues, it is possible to detect
some movement away from a middle power role, a deviation that once more reﬂects
the anti-imperialist strain in South African foreign policy.
On 12 July 2006, Israel launched a large-scale attack against Hezbollah in response
to its kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers, starting a war that was to last 34 days.
South Africa’s Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East 555
During this period, Hezbollah failed to return the soldiers and repeatedly ﬁred
rockets into Israel, while Israel’s heavy attacks resulted in the deaths of more than
1000 Lebanese, caused vast damage to Lebanese infrastructure, including Beirut’s
international airport, and resulted in the spilling of up to 15 000 tonnes of oil into the
Mediterranean after Israeli planes bombed the Jiyyeh power plant 30 Kilometres
south of Beirut (BBC News, 2006). While the US predictably delayed pressuring
Israel into a ceaseﬁre, South Africa joined an international chorus calling for an
immediate ceaseﬁre. The Israeli reaction was widely regarded as disproportionate
and condemned by France, Italy and Russia, among others. South Africa concurred
but went further, insinuating that Israel was guilty of war crimes (Business Day,
2006), which proved congruent with South Africa’s characteristically scathing
response to Israel’s misbehaviour.
The political battle over the establishment of a tribunal to prosecute suspects in the
assassination of Hariri has been at the core of deep division and paralysis in the
Lebanese political system. Opposition to the tribunal has come primarily from
Hezbollah, which receives its backing from Iran and Syria. The Syrian regime is widely
believed to have been behind Hariri’s assassination. Stalemated at home, current
Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora wrote to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon to ask the Security Council to put the tribunal into eﬀect as all domestic avenues
had been exhausted (United Nations, 2007b). On 30 May 2007, through a resolution
sponsored by the US and the United Kingdom, the UNSC authorized the
establishment of the tribunal by a vote of ten in favour, with China, Indonesia,
Qatar, Russia and South Africa abstaining. South Africa’s abstention was based on
the view that:
it is not appropriate for the Security Council to impose a tribunal on Lebanon,
especially under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. [South Africa] has frequently
cautioned that the Security Council should be judicious in its invocation of
Chapter VII of the UN Charter . . . [The Security Council] cannot be seen as
taking sides in internal Lebanese politics. There is a danger that the imposition
of the Special Tribunal on Lebanon without all the parties’ consent will
detrimentally aﬀect the political stability of an already fragile Lebanese state
(Department of Foreign Aﬀairs, 2007b).
While a call for caution has become characteristic of South African foreign policy, so
have invocations of respect for the sovereignty of developing countries. Indeed,
South Africa’s concern over the use of Chapter VII as a violation of Lebanese
sovereignty was shared by Syria, who fears the ﬁndings of the tribunal (International
Herald Tribune, 2007). More worryingly, as a result of its stance on the Lebanon
tribunal, South Africa has done further damage to its reputation as an impartial
broker, for once again it has found itself in opposition to the US and in the company
of its sworn enemies, in this case Hezbollah and Syria.
Hamas’s Electoral Victory
In the Palestinian parliamentary elections of 26 January 2006, the radical Islamic
group Hamas achieved a surprising but convincing victory over the more moderate
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Fatah. Although the election was free and fair, a government led by Hamas, which
the US and the EU list as a terrorist organization and which is oﬃcially committed
to the destruction of Israel, proved unacceptable to the West. In response, the
Quartet suspended direct aid to the Palestinian Authority, while Israel withheld
Palestinian tax revenues. The result has been a sharp decline in Palestinian living
standards and in the government’s ability to provide social services. Worse still,
vicious ﬁghting broke out between Fatah and Hamas as the two engaged in a
disastrous power struggle.
The ANC has a long history of solidarity with the Palestinians and has repeatedly
expressed its distress about Palestinian internecine ﬁghting and called for a cessation
of hostilities. The Quartet’s stance on Hamas’s electoral victory has been so harsh
that South Africa has had to do very little to fall foul of Western standards on this
issue. Against Israel and members of the Quartet, South Africa has urged an end to
the economic suﬀocation of Palestine. South Africa also condemned the various
members of the international community’s unwillingness to accept a Hamas-led
government which South Africa, by contrast, ﬁnds ‘‘perfectly acceptable’’ (Depart-
ment of Foreign Aﬀairs, 2007c). South Africa has demonstrated its independence by
inviting the Hamas leadership to visit South Africa. However, South Africa still has
to ﬁgure out how to reconcile Hamas’s fundamental rejection of Israel’s right to exist
with its vision of a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict which, at the
moment, seems impossible.
Conclusion
By drawing on examples from South African foreign policy towards the Middle East,
this article has attempted to show how an anti-imperialist element predictably surfaces
when South Africa attempts to perform the bridge-building role in international
society for which it has become known. While South Africa’s anti-imperialism is not
always unreasonable, it has nevertheless led South Africa into the proximity of actors
such as Syria, Iran, Hezbollah andHamas. South Africa’s association with such actors
is damaging to the country’s moral stature, as well as its ability to fulﬁl a mediating
role in the central conﬂicts of theMiddle East, as it seems unlikely to be regarded as an
impartial broker by Israel and its principal backer, the United States. Moreover, the
publicity that surrounded South Africa’s interventions in the Middle East reduced its
chances for success even further, especially when one contrasts the South African
approach with Norway’s more discreet and successful use of ‘back-channel’ diplomacy
to broker an agreement between Israel and the PLO during the mid-1990s (O¨sterud,
1997). The best example of South African ‘quiet diplomacy’ has of course been the
country’s (unsuccessful) ‘interventions’ in the ongoing crisis in Zimbabwe. South
Africa’s hushed approach and failure to publicly condemn Mugabe’s disastrous rule
stand in sharp contrast to the loud anti-imperialist protests the country registered over
conﬂicts in the Middle East. While the loyalty of emerging middle powers to those in
their region is to be expected, what we have witnessed in South Africa’s foreign policy
since the country’s run-in with Nigeria over the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa, and
demonstrated in this article with reference to conﬂicts in the Middle East, has been an
abandonment of judging each case of international conﬂict on its merits in favour of a
blanket solidarity with the developing world against the West.
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